Economics and Deterrence

Tonight we’ll be focusing on the economic  tools of national power, with some more specific focus on foreign aid.  It is important to realize that there are many types of economic tools with many different options available to policy makers, including various trade policies, direct aid, market promotion, and even disrupting sources of terrorist financial means.  Each type is complicated and—especially in the case of foreign aid—controversial.

The term foreign aid covers a wide range of programs designed to provide economic assistance to other nations.  These programs often have very different goals, targets, and limitations.  These are generally divided into 5 categories:

Need Based: aid based on poverty and humanitarian needs, includes both cash and food. 1/3 of U.S. aid of this type is funneled through multi-nationals.

Criteria based: Grants to countries that show progress on key development and governance indicators.

Politically based:  Support for allies that do not normally require aid, such as Pakistan and Israel.

Democracy Promotion: Programs to assist in transition from communist governments to capitalist.

Security/Law Enforcement: Mil and LE programs to assist and train in counter terrorism, internal security operations, etc.

It is important to understand that these programs are very fragmented throughout the USG.  Some programs are managed by State, others by Congress, others by Departments such as Agriculture. Often this aid is given without due consideration to foreign policy goals—a significant challenge not only for the Executive Branch, but especially for COCOMs.  With this as a base, we’ll start the night by looking at some of the causes of wealth/poverty, the impact, the use of foreign aid as a tool, and various trade policies and sanctions. Its more interesting than it sounds.

We’ll finish the night talking about Deterrence and deterrence theory.  The concept is a very old one in military history and theory—and has developed into a high art form since the end of the Second World War and the development of nuclear weapons.  We’ll look at the history of it and the development of the new concept of ‘tailored deterrence’—determining what will deter, especially in the era of GWOT and non-state actors.  It must be remembered that deterrence is THE key goal in our current strategies across the board, all of which acknowledge that it is better to achieve goals through the prevention of conflict than actual war, a last resort.

Strat 14/15: Force Planning and Security Cooperation

Last week we discussed the various strategies (ranging from National Strategy down to the CSP 21) and how they are written to reflect national, defense and service goals; this week we’ll examine means by which we aquire the tools to execute them. The first part of the class will focus on the most difficult portion of this, Force Planning.

 Wheter force planning is an art or a science is a matter of debate. At the most basic level, FP is exactly that: how do we design capabilities to accomplish a particular mission. Unfortunately, there’s a rub in that statement: what mission is most important? Forces take years to design and build; what will we need in the future? During the Cold War, force planning was fairly consistent, based on threat (the Soviet Union) and priorities given to each Service in terms of executing their part of the global strategy.  Now it’s much more complex–not only don’t we know what threat we’ll be facing, but we also are unclear the role of traditional military force in a world that is becoming increasingly hybrid and complex.

  For tonight’s session, pull from the readings a clear understanding of terminology, specifically force planning (the process), capabilities (think beyond hardware), uncertainty and risk (pros and cons of various coas), and various methods of force planning; see the Bartlett model in the reading that provides a good summary. What forces do you think we need for the future? Does the QDR 2010 agree?

The second part of the class will be dedicated to discussing various forms of Security Cooperation, defined as the ability of DOD to interact with foreign defense establishments to build relationships and promote mutual interests.  This is not a new mission but it is an increasingly complex one.  How does this fit into our discussion of force planning? It this a force multiplier for national security interests or a detriment? What kind of emphasis do you think security cooperation should be given in the future?

T12/13 Strategies

Tonight we’ll be examining a number of strategies at the national level that serve as the guiding documents for COCOM (and all other) operations.  It is important to remember when going through the readings a number of points; that while these documents are technically subordinate to each other, they are also prepared by different staffs (and sometimes administrations) and therefore can contain discrepancies. Second, although signed by the most senior officials, these documents are drafted by mid-grade staff officers–people at your level of rank and experience–and staffed by them.  It may surprise you but there’s a very good chance you’ll work on one of these in the future.

The “senior” document, the National Security Strategy (NMS) is required by law, specifically the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 which mandates that the President report to Congress a comprehensive report on the national security of the United States.  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is driven by this document but is not required by law; in point of fact the NDS is relatively new, started during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld to provide more specificity regarding the primary defense goals and objectives of the administration (note this has not been updated since 2008, the source of a number of discrepancies).  The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the means by which the tenets of the NDS are translated into policy, new capabilities, and initiatives. Finally, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 8 is guidance from the commander in chief on the execution of strategy. We’ll be covering these in detail.

The second session tonight will drill down on the Maritime Strategy, Cooperative Sea Power 21. Read this carefully as its a controversial document. Initially hailed as an expansion of the roles of maritime forces, the document has come under criticism for lack of specificity–as well as being unrealistic in terms of “who does what” or which missions are most important for naval forces.

Africom blog/social media/Centcom

Timing seems to be fortutious; please watch the following before class:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc&feature=youtube_gdata_player

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCv1GybEUxc&feature=youtube_gdata_player

The “Kony 2012” issue illustrates a number of the difficulties we discussed last week in the Africom AOR, especially when dealing with groups like the LRA. We’ll spend a little time at the beginning of class reviewing this in light of the new social media focus on the group.

Tonight’s session will be split into two parts. First, we’ll examine our final Cocom: Centcom. It’s appropriate we saved the Middle East for last, as it is by far the most challenging region in which we are engaged.  The issues faced in Centcom are enormous: long standing ethnic and political rivalries, tribal influences, the role of democracy and the recent uprest known as “arab spring,”  the emergence of Pakistan as an unofficial sponsor of terrorism, the spread of ALQ, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the ever present issues of oil and the Arab/Israeli conflict.  This is a long list–an entire course could be dedicated (and has been in the electives) to any one of these elements. We’ll be taking a long view strategically, examining the region historically and projecting what future U.S. engagement will look like in the long term.

The remainder of the class will be your first introduction to the end of course exercise that we’ll be conducting in the final part of the course.

S7/8: Northcom and Eucom

Tonight we”ll be continuing with our examination of the responsibilities of the various COCOMs, moving to Northcom and Eucom.

Northcom (Northern Command) is one of the newest and perhaps most controversial of the Cocoms.  Northcom was formed following the attacks of 9/11 and given the responsibility for homeland defense (HLD) of the continental U.S., as well as geographic responsibility for a several areas adjacent to the continent. Building on the foundation of NORAD, Northcom is unique in that it not only possesses direct responsibility for the homeland, but also is intensely interagency. This is a very complex operation. When you do the readings on Northcom, keep the following definitions in mind:

–Homeland Defense (HLD): Protection of the homeland against military attack. HLD missions are normally the responsibility of DOD (aka, Northcom)

–Homeland Security (HLS): Protection of the homeland against terrorist incidents or other forms of attack generally associated with law enforcement responsibility.  HLS is normally the function of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which works WITH Northcom, but is not subordinate to it (and vice versa).

–CANUS: the relationship between Canada and the U.S. Although this is the longest alliance the U.S. has had (and the most cooperative), a number of issues are rising to challenge it, including Arctic Sovereignty issues.

–MEXUS: the relationship between Mexico and the United States; close in terms of defense and trade, light years apart in terms of immigration. Al of these issues come under the auspices of Northcom.

EUCOM is one of the older Cocoms in terms of the relationships that have been established in the past–NATO is part of the overall Eucom scheme–but it is also subject to a number of new and increasingly complex factors.  This includes the European Union, the economic crisis, brushfire wars in the balkans and other ethnic hotspots, and continued challenges poised by the rise of new powers (such as the resurgence of Russia).  This is “old world/new challenges” that have to be considered.

We’ll be examining these tonight in a means similar to last week, with some discussion then separation into groups. See you Wed.

S5/6 PACOM Socio-Economic Challenges

From our initial discussion of strategy, it’s apparent that today the COCOMs must be aware of a host of issues that aren’t traditionally “military.” Today we’ll be looking at a number of these in the PACOM aor.

The first set of readings divests itself of our primary focus (China) and looks at southeast Asia, and India in particular. In the modern era India has become not only an economic powerhouse but also a key U.S. ally.  This wasn’t always the case. India emerged from independence during a time of immense internal violence which ultimately resulted in the separation of the nation into 2–India and Pakistan–and a long standing rivalry and hatred that has caused a number of wars between the them (and continued conflict over the contested region of Kashmir).  U.S. policy toward India has changed; under the Nixon administration the United States sided pointedly with Pakistan, encouraging India to lean toward the Soviets. Today we regard India as a “natural ally”–but there are internal problems, including poverty, energy needs, and terrorism. The remainder of the articles in this section deal with several of these issues in the region as a whole; China’s desire to build an oil pipeline, the Association of Southwest Asian Nations, and regional challenges as a whole–including religious based terrorism.

The second part of the session tonight we’ll be looking at security challenges–including the ever enigmatic North Korea.  North Korea is one of the few nations left in the world that is almost xenophobic in its paranoia, as well as its constantly state desire to go to war.  As a nation barely on the brink of starvation (and also armed with basic nuclear weapons), this is a constant concern not only to PACOM but also North Korea’s “friends” (aka China).  The military challenge of North Korea is just one security problem for the nations in the region; we’ll be briefly looing at this from the point of view of these nations, so dig into the readings on this point.  We’ll be dividing up into groups to do this as part of a small exercise, each group making a security assessment of their part of the region.

 

 

S-1/2: Introduction to Security Strategies and Global Challenges

Welcome to the third part of the course! Having examined Leadership and Policy, we now move into the world of strategy.  The purpose of this final section is to build on what we’ve examined previously by providing an overview not only of the fundamental concepts of strategy but also the various regional challenges faced by the COCOMs.  As we all know, this will culminate in your paper which will focus on a PACOM concern.  This part of the course will focus on big picture issues and will present a number of complex challenges so don’t be surprised; as we say at National, “strategy is hard.”

Tonight we’ll begin by looking at the world from the perspective of a regional combatant commander.  The Clancy/Zinni reading provides an excellent overview of the particular challenges of one of the most complex regions of the world.  Zinni had a long and distinguished career before taking over at CENTCOM, but he freely admits that much of what he had to deal with was far more in the diplomatic realm than anything he had encountered previously.  What were the specific challenges he faced? What were some of his non-kinetic responses? How would you have responded differently?

The second part of the evening will focus on various global challenges.  We’ve already discussed how globalization has “made the world smaller” and far more interactive; today, many of the crisis around the world can also be considered as “root causes” for the spread of international terrorism.  The post-cold war world has created an international system of enormous complexity; why do we care about drought in Africa? What is the impact of global warming? What will the proliferation of WMD do to the established international order?  Are these elements a direct threat to national security–or something that someone else should worry about?  The readings are intended to get you thinking in this direction–because it’s something that the COCOMS have to do on a daily (if not hourly) basis.

Good luck with wrapping up the policy paper, see you Wednesday. Go Patriots.

T-17: The Tanker Case

Short blog entry this week, more of an admin/scheduling point. Tonight we’ll be spending about an hour and a half in class going over the tanker case study before your cut loose to work on the exam (I’ll be emailing it out on tuesday with the attached deadline). Although the tanker case isn’t the exam, we’ll be walking through it using methodology similar to the problem that you’ll be asked to analyze; please read the case in advance so we can spend some quality time with it!

T-15/16: Religion and Strategic Communication

Tonight we’ll be examining two important yet often misunderstood influences on the Policy process: religion and strategic communications.

The subject of religion presents an interesting contradiction in American policy making.  On the one hand, religion is important to Americans; we are often celebrated as a people of faith, not only for the depth of our convictions but also the incredible diversity of religions beliefs that exist in our country.  Even though we are often categorized as a “christian nation,” the various sects and churches that define themselves in this regard are often very different.  Because we hold a deep belief in the freedom of religion, we are often hesitant to discuss elements of religion in our planning.  This can be a serious mistake when conducting overseas operations, as religious considerations (especially in different faiths) are often as important to our allies (and enemies) as it is to us.

For this reason it is critically important to understand the cultural underpinnings of faith in areas that the U.S. military will be operating.  Too often assumptions can lead to error which can exacerbate conflict.  For purposes of our discussion, note the various components of “just war” in both the christian and islamic traditions; both have ancient traditions in addressing conflict, and both fight under “rules” that are remarkably similar.  Note too the influences that various religious figures can have in the political sphere; this is especially apparent in the case study we’ll be examining, “The Ayatollah vs the Ambassador.”  In this case a lack of understanding regarding the shia faith–and its influence–had serious policy implications that in effect decided the course of the regional conflict.  How should this have been done differently?

Strategic Communications is also a misunderstood concept in policy circles, especially now with the rise of social media and almost instantaneous communications methods.  Strategic comms are those that directly involve the strategic interests of the United States.  In years past this was done via traditional media means in order to improve the image of the U.S. and its legitimacy while weakening that of an opponent.  The readings note a number of these methods, including diplomacy, infoed, op-eds, speaker programs, and other traditional media.  The problem with this now, however, is that it all can come crashing down with a single viral video clip; were the actions of a few soldiers at Abu-graib “strategic?”  How can these elements be managed–or can they be–in an effective strategic communications campaign?

 

Policy 13/14: Globalization and Ideology

Tonight we’ll be continuing our discussion of globalization by keying into a number of important trends and influencial factors: the role of non-government entities, and underlying elements of culture, ideology, and nationalism.

The rise of multi-national non-government entities is a relatively recent phenomenon that is driven by (and often drives) globalization.  There are a number of different types of groups, each with different motivations and operating methods. Multi-national corporations (MNCs) are economic powerhouses that are primarily motivated by profit.  Although corporations have always had an international component, today the economic power of many of these entities rivals or exceeds that of nation states.  Given this power, the profit motivation, it is very possible (often likely) that MNCs will operate in their own interests which are not necessarily aligned with national security goals.  NGOs are often non-profit international organizations with a specific agenda (red cross/red crescent, religious NGOs, doctors without borders, etc) but should not be discounted as often their political views or ideology could be different than forces in country–and they will most certainly conduct operations alongside of military forces, sometimes with counter objectives.  “Non-state” actors represent the darker side of globalization as these are often terrorist groups or organizations, of which ALQ is the most famous.

What is significant about these groups is they have serious and lasting influence on the international community.  Moreover, they can act in many ways like the nation state, particularly in the areas of the use of independent diplomacy, use of high tech communications, private armies/security firms, and the use of economic power–which is considerable.

Turning from multi-nationals, we’ll then take a look at 3 political phenomenons: culture, ideology, and nationalism.  We as operators are often dismissive as to how powerful these can be, especially culture.  Culture is how people live, fight, and is deeply rooted in tradition.  Interestingly this is not necessarily limited to types of people or indigenous groups, but can also be a global element–the “cultural elite” of many nations often have more in common with those in a similar economic class than their own countrymen.  Ideology is a political term that can be related to culture but can also transcend it.  As a political force, ideology often drives the basic functions of governments and militaries in the pursuit of national objectives.  Nationalism today is probably less of a force in driving conflict than it has been in the past (during the era of emerging nations in the post cold war era) but it should not be discounted, especially when used as a rallying cry to portray foreigners as invaders.