Tonight we’ll be examining a number of strategies at the national level that serve as the guiding documents for COCOM (and all other) operations. It is important to remember when going through the readings a number of points; that while these documents are technically subordinate to each other, they are also prepared by different staffs (and sometimes administrations) and therefore can contain discrepancies. Second, although signed by the most senior officials, these documents are drafted by mid-grade staff officers–people at your level of rank and experience–and staffed by them. It may surprise you but there’s a very good chance you’ll work on one of these in the future.
The “senior” document, the National Security Strategy (NMS) is required by law, specifically the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 which mandates that the President report to Congress a comprehensive report on the national security of the United States. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is driven by this document but is not required by law; in point of fact the NDS is relatively new, started during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld to provide more specificity regarding the primary defense goals and objectives of the administration (note this has not been updated since 2008, the source of a number of discrepancies). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the means by which the tenets of the NDS are translated into policy, new capabilities, and initiatives. Finally, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 8 is guidance from the commander in chief on the execution of strategy. We’ll be covering these in detail.
The second session tonight will drill down on the Maritime Strategy, Cooperative Sea Power 21. Read this carefully as its a controversial document. Initially hailed as an expansion of the roles of maritime forces, the document has come under criticism for lack of specificity–as well as being unrealistic in terms of “who does what” or which missions are most important for naval forces.
theater security decision making 