An understanding of civ-mil relationships is critical for the military professional as he/she moves upwards through the ranks. As junior officers this concept is highly abstract; as one becomes more senior and moves into the realm of the mid-grade to senior level staff officer, civ-mil becomes increasingly important not only as a professional concept but also as a practical one as you interact more with various agencies within government.
The United States military in that the concept of civilian control of the military is not only a well established tradition, but also a concept that is unique in its totality. For an absolutist (as we remember from our lively and interesting discussion last week), this is a very straightforward issue: civilians are in charge. But for a relativist this can be more complex. Military officers are charged with the responsibility to advise their civilian counterparts and their chain of command—this is eminently reasonable as military officers (or civilian staff in DOD positions) are experts in a very complex and technical profession. It is assumed that while civilians are “in charge,” they do not in fact direct operations, and that they are willing to take the advice of those experts in the military field. The problem arises when those “in charge” do not heed this advice. Sometimes this isn’t a problem—military officers salute smartly and execute. But other times this can present an enormous dilemma and can create conflict. The most famous historical case was the infamous conflict between General MacArthur and President Truman over the course of the Korean War, a very public disagreement that lead to MacArthur’s relief in what was (arguably) a conventional conflict. Today this issue is especially (in the mantra you’ll hear me repeat many times throughout the course) in the murky area that constitutes Irregular Warfare. Here we see disagreement at virtually all levels, from the tactical (such as the debate over who should conduct “nation building” operations in a conflict zone) to levels of troops required for conflict (the Shinseki debate). Even the decision to go to war can be fraught with peril, as we have seen in the recent past.
The readings reflect this dilemma—and illustrate it’s not a new one. Samuel Hunnington’s The Soldier and the State is a classic and must-read for those involved in theater security decision making. To put it in context, Hunnington is writing at a very difficult period of transition for the U.S. military. Recall that until the Second World War, the standing military forces of the United States were quite small; on the eve of war, our Army was ranked roughly 42nd in the world in size. This fits completely with the culture of the U.S. which generally did not support standing military forces, rather arguing for the concept of the “citizen soldier.” As the U.S. emerge from the war as a superpower with clear global interests in matching the power of the Soviet Union, this model no longer applied. The Cold War demanded an enormous standing force of trained technical professionals, something that was unique to America. Hunnington argues that today’s military are indeed professionals, exhibiting the core requirements of expertise, responsibility and corporatness-all in a unique environment that deals with the “management of violence.” In this regard, what is the relationship with civilian society and civilian control? Hunnington makes a number of important points. Civilian control of the military is basic in all three issues of military policy: quantitative issues (size of the force), qualitative issues, and dynamic issues (use of force). The two elements of this that constantly interact are functional imperatives and societal imperatives—in other words, how much should the military be compatible with liberal democratic values while maintaining the security of the nation?
Hunnington notes that America’s traditional liberal ideology makes this a difficult proposition. In times of low threat, the military is traditionally reduced in size (extirpation) while in times of high threat it is increased (transmutation)—but that an increased force is often a reflection of the liberal society, which limits effectiveness. A standing force for the long term requires a change in the societal imperative. His argument for objective control accomplishes this by demanding a military profession that Is politically sterile and neutral, an organization that increases strength by focusing strictly on professionalism. This autonomy in operational matters, however, is not absolute. On the other end of the spectrum is subjective control, where various elements of civilian society attempt to influence the military profession, usually for their own purposes. As decisions made in the political sphere will certainly effect the military profession (and we are all too human), he acknowledges that there will never be an absolutist form of either, but a continuous flux between the two ideals.
In “Breaking Ranks” Andrew Milligan attempts to bring Hunnington into the modern era. He argues that officers have an obligation to disobey an illegal order but he contends that his obligation should be extended to include legal “orders that present military professionals with moral dilemmas, decisions wherein the needs of the institution appear to weigh on both sides of the equation.” Hunnington is too absolutist and doesn’t recognize the military’s responsibility to speak out, especially to civilian leaders outside of the Congress (in other words, if there is disagreement with the commander in chief). Moreover, as the line between strategy and government policy is becoming increasingly blurred, military men must move beyond traditional obedience if either is flawed. This is a direct action, requiring, if necessary, resignation.
In What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations, Owens states that civ-mil describes the interactions among three groups: people, institutions, and military. To use a quaint analogy, the civil hand determines when to draw the sword and guide it, while the military hand keeps it sharp and wields it in combat. This is a bargain between the groups—but not one in which all are necessarily equal. There have been disagreements about this in the past that are primarily the result of changes in the security environment, and social and political factors. What is important here is to understand the depth of this control: that Civ-mil relations include more than simply “civilian control;” that “civilian control” does not just mean the whim of the executive, but also includes Congress; that the absence of a coup does not necessarily mean “it’s working;” and the argument between “professional supremacists” (who state that military officers should ‘find their voice’ in arguing for effective policy) and “civilian supremacists” who state that the military has no veto over policy. Finally, consider the “calculus of dissent”: what are the realistic options? Finally, when it comes to patterns in civ-mil relations and Service doctrine—this is important. It affects us, especially in the post 9/11 world.
theater security decision making 